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STATE LAW IN FEDERAL COURTS: THE IMPLICATIONS OF
DE NOVO REVIEW-In re McLinn, 739 E2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1984).
Federal courts are often called upon to apply state law. When they do so,
the Erie doctrine1 requires them to undertake the difficult task of predicting
how the highest court of the state whose law they are applying would rule
upon the issue.2 This task is so difficult that federal appellate courts have
traditionally relied on federal district courts, which are more familiar with
local law, to perform it.3
In In re McLinn,4 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this
traditional reliance on the district court's determination of state law and
held that issues of state law in federal court will be reviewed under a new, de
novo standard.5 The McLinn case reveals a dilemma in the treatment of
state law in federal courts. The Erie doctrine requires federal courts to
ascertain and apply state law, and gives them a broad responsibility for
doing so. At the same time federal courts are unable to accurately predict
and apply unresolved issues of state law.
The McLinn decision correctly recognizes the need for full appellate
review of those state law issues that are decided in federal courts. 6 How-
ever, it reveals the inconsistency of full review with the Erie goal of
conformity to state law.7 Full review reduces the ability of federal courts to
apply the same state law that would have been applied if the case had been
decided in state court.
This Note discusses the doctrine governing the treatment of state law in
federal courts and presents the McLinn case. It then analyzes the Erie
doctrine and the problems inherent in its application, and assesses the
McLinn court's approach to these problems. Finally, it suggests a way to
implement the McLinn decision while achieving the goal of accurate
application of state law in federal court.
1. The Erie doctrine, based on Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), governs the treatment
of state law in federal court. See generally 19 C. WiuoHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
& PROCEDURE §§ 4501-15 (1982) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILER].
2. See infra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 11 and accompanying text.
4. 739 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1984).
5. Id. at 1397.
6. Id. at 1398.
7. See infra text following note 67.
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I. BACKGROUND
In 1938 the United States Supreme Court decided in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins 8 that federal courts must apply state common law in diversity
actions in federal courts. 9 The Erie Court held that federal courts are to
apply state law as declared by the legislature or the state's highest court. 10
The Erie doctrine, based on that decision, requires federal courts to apply
the same state law that would be applied if the case arose in state court. I I If
there is no authoritative state ruling on an issue, the federal court is to
predict how the state's highest court would decide the issue at that time and
rule accordingly. 12
The goal of this prediction process is to apply the same state law to a
claim whether it is judged in federal or state court. 13 The Erie Court was
motivated by a desire to avoid the forum shopping that had arisen under
prior treatment of state law in federal court. 14 The decision discouraged
8. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
9. The Erie Court held that "[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state." Id. at 78.
10. Id.
1I. See generally 19 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 4507.
12. Federal courts have the responsibility of applying state law as it would currently be applied by
state courts, not as it has been applied in the past. See 17 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 4507, at
89. This requires federal courts to undertake an elaborate process of predicting state law. See Note, The
Ascertainnent of State Law in a Diversity Case, 40 IND. L.J. 541 (1965); see also Nolan v. Transocean
Air Lines, 365 U.S. 293 (1961). Federal courts are to look to relevant state court decisions as evidence
of how the state court would decide the issue, but should consider whether the decision is outdated or
there are other reasons for believing that the state's highest court would no longer adhere to that
precedent. 19 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 4507, at 91-94. In the absence of authoritative state
holdings on the issue, the federal courts may look to analogous decisions, to legislative intent, or to the
law of other circuits. See 19 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 4507, at 97-103; Wright, The Federal
Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 317, 321-22 (1967); Note, Federal
Interpretation of State Law-An Argument for Extended Scope of Inquiry, 53 MINN. L. REV. 806,
817-19 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Note, Federal Interpretation of State Law]; see also Bernhardt v.
Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 205 (1956) (federal courts should be sensitive to possible changes in
state law occurring subsequent to prior state holdings).
The principles governing treatment of state law in federal court have largely developed out of
diversity cases such as Erie. These principles are not, however, limited to application in diversity cases.
The Erie doctrine's requirements for application of state law in federal courts extends to the treatment of
all state law in federal courts. See 17 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 4507, at 82 & § 4515, at 275;
Note, Unclear State Law in the Federal Courts: Appellate Deference or Review?, 48 MINN. L. REV.
747, 748 & n.5 [hereinafter cited as Note, Appellate Deference]; see also Westen & Lehman, Is There
Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311 (1980) (discussing the application of
the Erie doctrine in non-diversity cases).
13. See Note, Deference to Federal Circuit Court Interpretations of Unsettled State Law, 1982
DUKE L.J. 704, 718-19 (1982) (goal of federal-state uniformity in application of state law).
14. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-77 (1938). Under the earlier rule of Swift v.
Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), federal courts attempted to apply a general federal common law.
Justice Brandeis noted in Erie that this allowed litigants to determine the content of the law applicable to
their case by manipulating the forum rules. 304 U.S. at 76-77; see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,
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litigants from choosing federal or state courts solely on the basis of which
court would apply the law most favorable to their case. 15
Federal appellate courts traditionally have pursued the goal of Erie by
deferring to district court determinations of state law issues. 16 The rationale
for this deference is that district judges are more familiar with the law of the
states in which they sit. 17 Thus, they are better able to conform to how a
state court would decide state law issues. 18
Prior to the Ninth Circuit's decision in McLinn, all of the circuits
deferred to the district judge's determination of state law.19 The Ninth
Circuit deferred according to the "clearly wrong" standard which it re-
jected in McLinn.20 Other circuits continue to defer.21 Although these
circuits articulate the standard of review differently, the standard is uni-
formly held to be highly deferential to the district judge's determination of
state law.22
468 (1965) (Erie aim of discouraging forum shopping).
15. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 74-75.
16. See 9 WRIGHT& M1LLER, supra note 1, § 2588, at 752-53; 32 FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYER'S
EDmON § 77.261 (1981).
17. See, e.g., Schulz v. Lamb, 591 F.2d 1268, 1271 (9th Cir. 1978) ("[b]ecause of the district
judge's presumed expertise in local law, his finding should be accepted on review unless clearly
wrong"); see also 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 2588, at 752.
18. C. VRIGHT, LAWOFFEDERALCOURTS § 59, at271 (3ded. 1976);Note, supranote 13, at711.
Most circuits, including the Ninth, have traditionally deferred only when district judges are ruling on
the law. of the state in which they sit. See, e.g., Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897,904 (9th Cir.
1983). Only the Eighth Circuit defers to decisions on state law by district court judges who are from
another state and thus have no particular expertise in the law in question. See, e.g., St. Paul Hosp. &
Casualty Co. v. Helsby, 304 F.2d 758, 759 (8th Cir. 1962); see also Note, supra note 13, at 712 n.48.
19. See, e.g., Rudd Constr. Equip. Co. v. Clark Equip. Co., 735 F.2d 974, 978 (6th Cir. 1984)
("considerable weight"); Acree v. Shell Oil Co., 721 F.2d 524, 525 (5th Cir. 1983) ("great weight");
Caspary v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 707 F.2d 785, 788-89 (4th Cir. 1983) ("substantial
deference"); King v. Horizon Corp., 701 F.2d 1313, 1315 (10th Cir. 1983) ("clearly erroneous");
Alabama Elec. Coop. v. First Nat'l Bank, 684 F.2d 789, 792 (1 1th Cir. 1982) ("entitled to deference").
20. See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. v. Schwab, 739 F.2d 431 (9th Cir. 1984) ("clearly wrong" standard
customary for review of district court determination of state law); Taylor v. Sentry Life Ins. Co., 729
F.2d 652, 654 (9th Cir. 1984) ("substantial deference" to the district judge under the "clearly wrong"
standard); Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. American Guar. Life Ins. Co., 722 F.2d 1498, 1500 (9th Cir.
1984) (appellate court will accept district court determination of state law unless "clearly wrong");
Zieman Mfg. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 724 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1983) (same). Although the
prior deferential standard was usually expressed as permitting reversal of the district court where it was
"clearly wrong," this wording frequently varied. See, e.g., Shakey's, Inc. v. Covalt, 704 F.2d 426,436
(9th Cir. 1983) (equates "clearly wrong" with "clear error"). The McLinn majority termed the prior
standard as both "clearly wrong" and "clear error." McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1397, 1402.
21. See supra note 19.
22. Id. The Eighth Circuit has held that it will defer to a "reasonable interpretation" of the state law
issue by the district court judge. Tharalson v. Pfizer Genetics, Inc. 728 F.2d 1108, 1111 (8th Cir. 1984).
The Tenth Circuit has held that in the absence of controlling state precedent, the decision of the district
judge will carry "extraordinary force" on appeal. McGehee v. Farmers Ins. Co. 734 F.2d 1422, 1424
(10th Cir. 1984).
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The United States Supreme Court also adheres to a policy of limited
review of state law issues. 23 While this policy is expressed as one of
deference, the Court generally does not consider state law issues at all. 24
The traditional, pre-McLinn treatment of state law in federal courts thus
entails full consideration at the district court level, limited review at the
appellate level, and nonreview by the Supreme Court. The appellate court
gives the district court's decision substantial weight, which must be over-
come for the appellate court to decide differently.25 By contrast, under the
usual de novo standard of review for legal issues, the appellate court may
freely substitute its own determination of an issue of federal law for that of
the district court. 26
II. THE MCLINN FACTS AND HOLDING
The McLinn case arose out of the collision of two skiffs off of the coast of
Kodiak, Alaska. 27 The district court granted federal admiralty jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1)28 and Foremost Insurance Co. v. Richardson.29
The plaintiffs asserted personal injury and wrongful death claims based on
Alaska law in addition to their federal claims as allowed under 46 U.S.C.
§ 1489.30
The personal injury and wrongful death actions were based on an Alaska
statute that has never been interpreted definitively by the Alaska Supreme
23. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 346-47 & n.10 (1976); Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S.
232, 237 (1944) (Supreme Court ordinarily does not review appellate court determinations of state law);
see also IA J. MOORE, B. RINGLE & J. WICKER, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE $.309[2], at 3127 n.28 (2d
ed. 1985) (Supreme Court will ordinarily accept the determination of local law by the federal court of
appeals) [hereinafter cited as J. MOORE].
24. See, e.g., Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1979) (Supreme Court "declines to
review" state law question); Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232, 237 (1944) (Supreme Court
ordinarily accepts and therefore does not review state law issues).
25. Deferential review presumes that the district court's determination is correct and should not be
overturned unless, for example, it is "clearly wrong" or "clearly erroneous." See Airlift Int'l, Inc. v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 685 F.2d 267, 269 (9th Cir. 1982); Chavez v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 547
F.2d 541, 543 (10th Cir. 1977).
26. De novo review is simply a full and independent reconsideration and decision upon appeal. See
McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1399-1400.
27. Id. at 1397. The accident involved three skiffs, two of which collided.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1982).
29. 457 U.S. 668, 669 (1982). Foremost held that the collision of vessels on navigable waters is
within federal admiralty jurisdiction. The collision in McLinn, which occurred in the channel between
Near Island and Kodiak Island in southeastern Alaska, was thus included. See In re McLinn, No. A80-
038, slip op. at 2 (D.C. Alaska Nov. 4, 1982); see also Brief for Appellants at 9, In re McLinn, 739 F.2d
1395 (9th Cir. 1984).
30. 46 U.S.C. § 1489 (1982). Parties may assert claims based on state as well as on federal law
under this section. This "savings provision" provides that parties shall not lose claims based on state
law through the granting of federal jurisdiction.
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Court. 31 Resolution of the claims turned upon the meaning and ap-
plicability of this statute.32 The United States District Court for the District
of Alaska held that the statute did not apply.33 On appeal, the three-judge
panel of the Ninth Circuit came to the opposite conclusion but requested en
banc review because the standard of review precluded it from reversing. 34
Under the Ninth Circuit's traditional deferential standard, the panel could
have reversed the district court's holding only if it was "clearly wrong." 35
The panel indicated that if it were to review the matter de novo, it would
reverse.
36
In an en banc review the court of appeals held that it would apply a new
standard of review to district court determinations of state law.37 The court
abandoned the deferential "clearly wrong" standard and held that the court
of appeals should review all legal issues, both state and federal, under an
independent de novo standard.38 Five of the eleven judges dissented, urging
that appellate courts continue to review questions of state law under a
deferential standard. 39
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Erie Dilemma
The Erie doctrine rests upon the premise that law consists of a set of
articulable principles and doctrine that can be accurately applied in any
forum.40 It assumes that federal courts can accurately apply state law and
31. ALASKA STAT. § 05.25.040 (1981); see also McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1397.
32. The plaintiffs asserted that the defendants were civilly liable for the negligent operation of one
of the skiffs involved in the accident under ALASKA STAT. § 05.25.040 (1981). This statute makes
owners of watercraft civilly liable for injury or damage caused by the negligent operation of their
watercraft. Id. The plaintiff's claim turned on whether the defendant's skiff was a watercraft within the
meaning of the statute as defined by ALASKA STAT. § 05.25.100(4) (1981). That section defines
watercraft as vessels which are, among other criteria, devoted to recreational pursuits. The claim
involved in McLinn turned on the issue of whether a chiefly commercial vessel which is being used
recreationally at the time of an accident is a watercraft under § 05.25.100(4). See In re McLinn, No.
A80-038, slip op. at 6 (D.C. Alaska, Nov. 4, 1982).
33. The district court held that the skiff in question was not a watercraft within the meaning of
ALASKA STAT. § 05.25.100(4) (1981). In re McLinn, No. A80-038, slip op. at 6-7 (D.C. Alaska, Nov.
4, 1982).
34. McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1397.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1397-98.
39. Id. at 1403.
40. See Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, The Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity
Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187, 215-18 (1957) (under Erie, the bases of state law are assumed to be
communicable to federal judges no less than state judges). Id. at 217.
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that different federal courts will be equally capable of doing SO. 4 1 Under
Erie, federal courts are presumed capable of selecting and applying state
law in an almost mechanical way.42 Neither the local expertise of the state
court nor of the federal district court is considered necessary to application
of state law.
The Erie doctrine does not acknowledge the role of local expertise in
federal treatment of state law because it assumes that federal courts can
accurately apply state law without it. Unfortunately, this assumption is
false. Erie requires federal courts to undertake a process of predicting state
court action so difficult that it cannot realistically be performed. 43 The Erie
requirement that federal courts decide state law issues as the state's highest
court would decide them poses an impossible task. Federal courts cannot
know how a state court would rule on a given issue. The attempt to predict
how a state's highest court would rule necessarily depends largely on
speculation. 4
The Erie doctrine poses a particular problem for federal courts when
they must decide unresolved issues of state law.45 When there is no existing
state doctrine, federal courts must themselves create the state law that they
apply.46 This process goes far beyond merely applying state law. Federal
courts may be able to predict state law accurately if there is strong doctrinal
support for the decision. 47 However, it is not realistic to expect them to
41. The Erie decision required a federal court sitting in New York to apply Pennsylvania law. Erie,
304 U.S. at 69, 80. By holding that federal courts are to apply state law it implicitly assumes that federal
judges sitting outside a state will be able to ascertain and apply the law of that state.
42. See R. JACKSON, FULL FAITH AND CREDIT: THE LAWYER'S CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION I n.2
(1945).
43. The Supreme Court recognized the difficulty of applying Erie in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co..
350 U.S. 198,208 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("it is not always easy and sometimes difficult to
ascertain what the governing state law is"); see also Wright, supra note 12, at 321-22 (on the
"laborious" and "onerous" task of deciding cases under Erie: "it is easier to make good law than
successfully to predict how it will be made"); Sheran & Isaacman, State Law Belongs in State Courts,
12 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 57 (1978) (while application of Erie may appear to be a simple task, "in
practice it has done more to confuse the law than create evenhanded application").
44. Commentators have interpreted Erie as requiring federal courts to use their "judicial brains" to
resolve state law issues. By this reasoning, federal judges are to use their personal judgment, rather than
rely purely on state sources, in order to predict how the state court would currently rule on the issues
involved. See Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v.
Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 290-91 (1946); Corbin, The Laws of the Several States, 50 YALE L.J. 762,
775 (1941).
45. The greater the ambiguity of the state law issue, the greater the difference between the
capacities of the state and federal courts to reach the "correct" result. Field, Abstention in Constitu-
tional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071, 1093 (1974); see
also 19 WRIGHT & MILLER,supra note 1, 4507, at 97-103; Note, Federal Interpretation of State Law.
supra note 12, at 817-19 (1969); Wright, supra note 12, at 321-22.
46. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
47. See Field, supra note 45, at 1090.
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resolve the complexities of novel issues in the same manner as the state's
highest court.48
In an effort to follow Erie's command to apply the same law that state
courts would, federal appellate courts customarily limit their review of
state law by deferring to district court judges. 49 District court judges are
considered better able to ascertain state law and thus better able to achieve
the Erie goal of conformity to state court decisions. The cases indicate that
appellate court judges readily defer to the greater expertise of district
judges ruling on the law of the state in which they sit.50
This practice is based on a sound assessment of the relative abilities of
the district and appellate courts. District court judges are more familiar
with local traditions and law than are circuit judges who often sit far from
the locus of the law in question. 511n the Ninth Circuit, the states of Alaska
and Hawaii and the territory of Guam are examples of regions with distinct
local traditions that affect their law. District court judges sitting in these
regions are far more likely than circuit judges to be familiar with both the
substance and the background of local law.52 The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals has long recognized this and deferred accordingly.
Deference to the district court decision thus furthers the Erie goal of
conformity. However, it also has significant costs. The district court's
determination of state law does not receive full appellate review. 53 Thus,
state law does not receive the full judicial attention in federal court that it
would in state court. Appellate review should not be denied simply because
a case arises in the federal forum.54 This compromises the right to de novo
48. State supreme courts are the best authority on state law. See Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch,
387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967) ("the State's highest court is the best authority on its own law"). Federal
ability to resolve state law issues is necessarily inferior to that of the state supreme court.
49. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Ball v. Tokyu Land Corp., 724 F.2d 1403; 1404 (9th Cir. 1984) (appellate court must
defer to district court decision of state law based on "tenable theory").
51. See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278, 285 (2d Cir. 1981) (Mansfield, J.,
dissenting) (" [u]nlike a state court or a federal district court within a single state, the court of appeals of
a circuit in which several states are located, which disposes of diversity appeals as only a small
percentage of its business, is not likely to gain any special familiarity with the law of one of the states
within its boundaries"), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982).
52. See, e.g., Laguana v. Guam Visitors Bureau, 725 F.2d 519,520-21 (1984) (determinations of
district court afforded deference due to familiarity with local Guam needs and customs).
53. See, e.g., Smith v. Strum, Roger & Co., 524 F.2d 776, 778 (9th Cir. 1975) (appellate review
"narrowly circumscribed" under deferential "clearly wrong" standard).
54. Since state law issues would be granted full review upon appeal in state courts, it is placing
undue prejudice upon the parties involved-particularly those who may not have chosen the forum-to
deny that full review in the federal appellate process. Issues of foreign law are reviewed de novo by the
appellate court under FED. R. Ctv. P. 44.1. Full review of issues of state law should also be provided.
See Kurland, supra note 40, at 215-18.
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review of legal issues that is established by statute in both state and federal
courts.
B. McLinn: Rejecting Conformity in Favor of Full Review
The McLinn court correctly concluded that the cost of limited review
under the deferential standard is too high. 55 However, the court failed to
acknowledge the full impact of its decision. It did not recognize that its
rejection of the local expertise of district judges was a departure from the
Erie goal of conformity. 56 The McLinn decision has the effect of replacing
the emphasis on conformity to state law with an emphasis on providing
appellate review. This change in emphasis increases the risk of federal
courts creating doctrine that diverges from a state's interpretation of its own
law.
Emphasis on the appellate rather than district court determination of
state law issues encourages the development of divergent doctrine because
the appellate court is less familiar with state law and is less able to
accurately predict how the state's highest court would rule. If the Erie goal
is difficult to attain at the district court level, it is still more so at the
appellate level. The appellate court's lack of familiarity with state law
increases the speculativeness of its prediction of state supreme court action.
This is especially true when previously unresolved issues of state law are
presented. Yet decisions of previously unresolved issues are also most
likely to have precedential effect. These federal appellate determinations of
state law will thus be perpetuated throughout the federal system.
The McLinn court heightened the impact of its decision by implicitly
assuming that it is appropriate to give increased precedential effect to
federal determinations of state law.57 It maintained that full review is
required because federal courts look to prior federal decisions in their
determination of state law issues. 58 Erie does not command federal courts
to rely only on established state doctrine, but it does not, however, license
federal courts to rely on federal rather than state sources to ascertain state
55. McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1398, 1403.
56. De novo review rejects the local expertise of the district judge because it gives priority to the
appellate court's determination of state law issues. Although the district judge's opinion may be
considered by the appellate court under de novo review, it no longer carries the weight that it received
under deferential review. The district judge's judgment has no compelling force when it is merely
considered by the appellate court along with other factors in making its decision. Under deferential
review, by contrast, the district judge's decision is controlling unless it is, to use the Ninth Circuit's
language, "clearly wrong." It cannot be overturned simply because the appellate court reaches a
different conclusion. Under de novo review, while the district court's judgment may be of influence, it is
still the appellate court's judgment which is decisive.
57. McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1401-02.
58. Id.
746
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law. To the contrary, Erie requires federal courts to look to state sources to
determine how state courts would determine unclear issues of state law.59
This reliance on federal sources results in an independent body of
federally created state law which will have precedential value in federal, but
not state, courts. 60 Federal holdings on state law may be overruled by later
state supreme court decisions, 61 but before a state court conclusively
resolves an issue, federally created state law will control in federal courts. 62
This creates the potential for forum shopping between state and federal
courts. Parties may choose the federal forum to gain the advantage of
federal precedent on the issue or may choose the state forum to avoid the
effect of those holdings.63 This presents exactly the kind of problem that
Erie was meant to prevent. 64
Although federal courts currently rely on federal decisions of state law in
the absence of authoritative state holdings, McLinn will encourage the
practice. The McLinn court's acceptance of the practice gives it new
validity by mandating the appellate courts' creation of a body of separate
doctrine.
The McLinn court did not appreciate the impact of its decision because it
assumed that all federal courts are capable of accurately predicting and
59. Erie held that federal courts must apply state law as "declared by [the state's] Legislature in a
statute orby its highest court ... " 304 U.S. at78. Subsequent application of Erie has extended the
scope of sources considered by federal courts in applying state law. See supra note 6 and accompanying
text. Despite the increasing federal reliance on prior federal holdings, see infra note 60, these sources
should be limited to state sources to be consistent with Erie. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 ("[t]he'authority
and only authority is the State") (quoting Justice Holmes' dissent in Black & White Taxicab Co. v.
Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 535 (1928)); see also Note, supra note 13, at
718-21 (federal reliance on prior federal decisions forsakes Erie requirement of applying state law as it
would be applied by the state's highest court for the goal of uniformity of federal application of state
law).
60. Federal decisions on state law issues have limited precedential effect, but they do influence
future federal and state decisions. Federal decisions are not binding on state courts, see infra note 61 and
accompanying text, but they may carry precedential weight in federal courts insofar as they are
consistent with state court decisions. In the absence of authoritative state decisions, federal decisions on
state law are considered and relied upon by lower federal courts. See J. MooRE, supra note 23,
.309[2], at 3122-25 & n. 19; United States v. County of Humboldt, 628 F.2d 549,551 (9th Cir. 1980)
(where state court has not yet decided issues, federal court looks to relevant federal appellate decisions).
As the McLinn majority noted, the Ninth Circuit has relied heavily on prior federal holdings on state
law. McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1401-02. In Whittaker Corp. v. Execuair Corp., 736 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1984),
the court relied upon the prior Ninth Circuit ruling on California law in Monolith Portland Midwest Co.
v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 407 F. 2d 288 (9th Cir. 1969). Recent holdings show an increasing
reliance on federal holdings on state law. See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 652 F.2d 278,
283 (2d Cir. 1981) (federal appellate court's interpretation of the law of a state located within its circuit is
binding on federal courts in other circuits in the absence of an authoritative state declaration to the
contrary), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 927 (1982).
61. See J. MOORE, supra note 23, .309[2], at 3123 n.19; Wright, supra note 12, at 322.
62. See supra note 61.
63. See Sheran & Isaacman, supra note 43, at 58-59; supra note 8 and accompanying text.
64. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
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applying state law. It rejected the traditional belief that district judges are
better able to do so.65 The court concluded that de novo review is preferable
both in terms of providing review66 and in creating law. 67 In practice,
however, de novo review is preferable only for providing review because the
district judge is better able to ascertain state law.
Central to both the Erie and McLinn decisions is the assumption that
federal courts are capable of accurately applying state law and that federal
district and appellate courts are equally capable of doing so. Under this
assumption, the objective of providing full review is consistent with the
objective of applying the same state law in state and federal courts. In
practice, however, the difficulty of applying Erie makes it impossible to
fully achieve both of these objectives. If appellate courts rely on the local
expertise of the district judge to attain greater conformity to state law they
necessarily limit review.
This dilemma compels a compromise between the two objectives. Defer-
ential review resolves the conflict in favor of conformity with state law; de
novo review resolves it in favor of review. The McLinn court did not take
this inherent tradeoff of objectives into account. Although the court was
correct to adopt de novo review, its decision compromises important
objectives of the judicial system. In implementing McLinn, the Ninth
Circuit should seek ways to limit the impact of this compromise.
C. Implementing McLinn: Avoiding the Dilemma
Federal courts can most accurately apply state law if they avoid deter-
mining unclear state law issues themselves. 68 This can be done by
65. McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1400. The court denied, specifically, that the expertise of the district judge
with respect to state law issues is any greater than that of the appellate court. The court based its
conclusion on the fact that one of the McLinn judges had experience in Alaskan law commensurate with
that of the district judge. Id. It is true that in some cases the appellate panel may have significant
experience in the state law to be applied. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Kase, 718 F.2d 306,
307 (9th Cir. 1983). However, deference to the district judge ruling on the law of the state in which the
judge sits more consistently assures that priority is given to the judgment of the court with greatest
experience in the relevant state law.
66. McLinn, 739 F.2d at 1398.
67. Id. at 1401-02.
68. State court decision of a state's own law is preferable to federal decision of that law because
state courts are better able to predict state supreme court action than federal courts. See Field, supra
note 45, at 1091 n.86; see also Wright, supra note 12, at 321-22 (easier to make good law than to predict
it). Where unclear issues of state law are being decided, the gap between federal and state court ability to
predict state action is particularly great. Field, supra note 45, at 1093; see also Bork, Dealing With the
Overload in Article III Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231, 237 (1976) (federal courts have no expertise in state law
and are particularly disadvantaged where a diversity suit requires the decision of a point not settled by
state court).
Vol. 60:739, 1985
State Law in Federal Courts
restricting federal jurisdiction over state law,69 by abstaining on state law
issues, 70 and by certifying questions of state law to state courts. 71 These
processes would allow state courts to determine their own law and thus
avoid unwieldy, speculative federal decisionmaking. They would also
result in state-created doctrine of clear precedential value. 72
Much federal decision of state law would be avoided if Congress abol-
ished federal diversity jurisdiction. 73 Commentators have strongly advo-
cated the abolishment of diversity jurisdiction as a way to ease the over-
crowding of federal courts. 74 In addition to reducing the number of cases
brought in federal courts, it would have the advantage of leaving state law
decisions to state courts. 75 State law would still arise in federal question
cases because of pendant and ancillary jurisdiction.76 The volume would be
69. See infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
71. See infra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
Certification is commonly described as a variety of abstention, see 17 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
I,§ 4241, at 441, because it is a means of avoiding-or abstaining from-federal decision of state law.
However, it is a separate process involving procedures distinctively different than those of traditional
abstention. See infra notes 81, 84 and accompanying text.
72. Decisions of the state supreme courts through certification procedures are authoritative
pronouncements of state law. They bind both state and federal courts. Federal decisions of state law, by
contrast, do not. See supra note 61. Federal decision of state law creates precedent of limited
applicability and delays conclusive resolution of state law issues by the state courts. State court decision
of state law, by contrast, furthers the development of state doctrine. See Wright, supra note 12, at
322-23 (deciding state law issues in federal rather than state court "retards" development of state law);
see also Sheran & Isaacman, supra note 43, at 58 (diversity cases perform no creative function in the
evolution of the law and thereby waste public resources).
73. Federal diversity jurisdiction is provided under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2)-(3) (1982). It is
responsible for a large proportion of cases brought in federal court. In 1975, for example, there were
30,631 diversity cases pending in federal courts, or 21.5 percent of the total docket. Bork, supra note
68, at 236-37. Abolishing diversity jurisdiction would remove this entire body of cases, which are
based on state law, to state courts. While state law issues would still arise in federal courts, see 19
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 4507, at 80-81, this would reduce the volume of those issues
dramatically.
74. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 68, at 236-37; Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdic-
tion, 41 HARv. L. REv. 483, 510 (1928); Rowe, Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction: Positive Side Effects
and Potentialfor Further Reforms, 92 HARv. L. REv. 963,969 (1979). For a listing of relevant articles,
see C. WRIGHT, supra note 18, at 130 & nn.16-17.
Arguments against diversity jurisdiction have emphasized the lack of positive reasons for it and the
need for a reduction in federal caseloads and jury trials as well as its effect on the treatment of state law.
Rowe, supra, at 966. Rowe notes that abolition of diversity jurisdiction would result in "vastly fewer
Erie problems of applicability, choice, determination and application of state law in the federal courts."
Id. at 969.
75. See generally Sheran & Isaacman, supra note 43.
76. See 19 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 4515, at 276-77; cf. Westen & Lehman, supra note
12, at 377-88.
McLinn offers a typical example of the type of case that would continue to arise in federal court after
the abolition of diversity jurisdiction. The plaintiffs in McLinn were able to raise state claims in federal
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far less, however, and state law issues would be less likely to be central to
the dispute.
The federal courts could reduce the amount of state law they decide by
abstaining on unresolved state law questions. 77 Federal courts may cur-
rently abstain in some circumstances to avoid deciding unclear issues of
state law, 78 but this practice has proved controversial. 79 The United States
Supreme Court held in Meredith v. City of Winter Haven80 that the diffi-
culty of ascertaining state law does not, in itself, provide a sufficient basis
for a federal court to abstain from deciding a state law issue. Furthermore,
because abstention involves instigating a new proceeding in state court to
decide the state law issue, the process is costly and time-consuming. 8
Federal courts thus tend not to decline from deciding unclear state law
issues unless certification is available.82
Certification of state law issues to state courts provides the most direct
and feasible means of avoiding federal decision of state law issues. The
certification process allows federal courts to submit state law issues to state
court under admiralty jurisdiction because the "savings clause" of 46 U.S.C. § 1489 (1982) provides
that federal jurisdiction shall not eliminate any otherwise existing causes of action.
The problem of applying state law outside of its original forum also arises in state courts. This Note
does not address the issues associated with that process. The principles of the Erie doctrine, particularly
the underlying concern for federalism, see Erie, 304 U.S. at 79, impose a different set of considerations
than are involved when a state court applies the law of another forum. See Sheran & Isaacman, supra
note 43, at 59 (litigation of state law issues in state courts comports better with principles of federalism).
77. See 17 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 4246.
78. Federal courts may also abstain to avoid premature decision of constitutional issues (Pullman
abstention) or to avoid interference with state policies (Burford abstention). See generally 17 WRIGHT &
MILLER, §§ 4242-43 (Pullman-type), 4244-45 (Burford-type). Abstention on these grounds has been
widely accepted, while the practice of abstaining to avoid unclear issues of state law has not. See id.
§ 4246, at 492, 498-99.
79. See id.
80. 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943).
81. Under abstention, state law claims are removed for decision in state court. After those claims
are decided, parties may return to litigate federal issues in federal court. See England v. Louisiana State
Bd. of Med. Examiners, 375 U.S. 411,417 (1964); Field, supra note 45, at 1079. Thus, the party must
undertake litigation in two separate courts. Judge Skelly Wright suggests that this deprives the litigants
of their right to trial in a federal court. Wright, supra note 12, at 325; see also Kurland, Toward A Co-
operative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481, 489 (1960)
(where Congress has created the right to utilize federal court, the Supreme Court has no right to limit
that access).
82. See, e.g., Zbaraz v. Quern, 572 F.2d 582,587 (7th Cir. 1978) (abstention order of district court
reversed where certification not available).
Professor Martha Field, author of a leading 1974 article on Pullman-type abstention, see Field, supra
note 45, concluded in a later article that abstention is not worth its costs and should only be applied
where it can be accomplished through certification rather than traditional abstention procedures. See
Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 590, 605, 609 (1977). The Supreme Court
similarly implied in Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 150-51(1976), that where delay and expense would
otherwise weigh against traditional abstention, it would be appropriate to use certification if available.
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supreme courts for decision.83Because the state law issues, rather than the
entire case, are removed to state court, the process is more efficient and less
time-consuming than abstention. 84 Numerous states, including Alaska,
have adopted certification procedures. 85 The practice has grown rapidly-in
acceptance since the United States Supreme Court sanctioned the process
in 1974 in Lehman Brothers v. Schein.86 Justice Douglas, speaking for the
Court, emphasized the role of certification in the growth of a cooperative
judicial federalism. 87 He noted the appropriateness of the use of certifica-
tion where state law is unclear and when "outsiders" lacking familiarity
with local law are called upon to decide these issues.88
The Ninth Circuit has demonstrated its acceptance of certification by its
use of the process. 89 The court explicitly approved certification in 1969 in
Turnbull v. Bonkowski.9 This case, like McLinn, turned on the application
83. See generally 17 WRIGHT& MILLER, supra note 1, § 4248; J. MOORE, supra note 23, .203[5].
84. See Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 394 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); see also J.
MOORE, supra note 23, .203[5], at 2157-58.
85. Twenty-six states and Puerto Rico have adopted certification procedures. 17 WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 1, § 4248, at 525 nn.29 & 174 (Supp. 1985); ALASKA App. R. 407.
The availability of certification is determined by state law because federal courts cannot compel state
supreme courts to certify. See Weaver v. Marine Bank, 683 F.2d 744, 747 (3d Cir. 1982); see also 17
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra'note 1, § 4248 at 523 & n.22; Turnbull v. Bonkowski, 419 F.2d 104, 106 (9th
Cir. 1969). In 1965, Florida was the only state in which certification was available, and it-was rarely
invoked. Lillich & Mundy, Federal Court Certification of Doubtful State Law Questions, 18 U.C.L.A.
L. REv. 888, 888 (1971). However, there has been a dramatic increase in state adoption of certification
procedures in recent years. See generally id. at 888-91 (increase in acceptance and use of certification);
17 WRIGHT & MILLER supra, note 1, § 4248, at 523.
For representative certification provisions, see ALASKA ApP. R. 407; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031
(1983); FLA. App. R. 9.150; WASH. REV. CODE § 2.60.010-.900 (1983); WASH. R. App. P. -16.16; see
also Unif. Certification of Questions of Law Act 88 1-13, 12 U.L.A. 49-56 (1975). Twenty-four
jurisdictions have adopted the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act. Id. at 19 (Supp. 1985).
86. 416 U.S. 386 (1974).
87. Id. at 391. Justice Douglas' majority opinion noted that certification "save[s] time, energy, and
resources and helps build a cooperative judicial federalism." Id. However, Justice Rehnquist's con-
curring opinion noted the delay involved in certification and cautioned against indiscriminate use of the
procedure. Id. at 394-95 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist noted that although certifica-
tion may be more efficient than traditional abstention, it entails more time and expense than federal
decision of the state law question. Id. at 394 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 390-91.
The Supreme Court affirmed its acceptance of certification in Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976),
in which the Court certified a previously unconstrued statutue to the Supreme Court of Connecticut.
The case involved a constitutional issue, and traditional Pullman-type abstention, see supra note 78,
could have been invoked. However, the Court noted the delay involved in traditional abstention and held
that certification should be applied. The courtrelied on its earlier statement in Lehman Bros. v. Schein,
416 U.S. 386, 390 (1974), that certification saves time. 426 U.S. at 151.-
89. See, e.g., Meckert v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 742 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1984); Queets Band of
Indians v. Wash., 714 F.2d 1008, 1009 (9th Cir. 1983); Estate of Madsen v. Commissioner, 659 F.2d
897, 899 (9th Cir. 1981); Mutschler v. People's Nat'l Bank, 607 F.2d 274, 278-79 (9th Cir. 1979).
90. 419 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1969).
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of an Alaska statute. 91 The court could not avoid deciding the issue because
the Alaska Supreme Court had not yet adopted certification procedures. 92
The court stated that the Alaska Supreme Court should have been the first to
resolve the issue.93 It noted the desirability of certification in such situa-
tions and regretted being forced to decide the issue itself.94 In 1984 the
Ninth Circuit affirmed its support of certification in Meckert v. Transocean
Insurance Co., 95 noting the Supreme Court's observation that certification
saves "time, energy and resources and helps build a cooperative judicial
federalism. ",96
Although several states in the Ninth Circuit have adopted certification
procedures, 97 the Ninth Circuit still has no established criteria for when to
certify an issue. 98 In Mutschler v. Peoples National Bank,99 the Ninth
Circuit allowed certification simply because the issue was one of state
statutory interpretation. 100 No further criteria were suggested. In Estate of
Madsen, 101 the court held that it is appropriate to certify questions of
statutory interpretation when the state court's position on the issue is
unclear. 10 2 In Queets Band ofIndians, 103 however, the court again failed to
suggest any criteria for certification. 10 4
The Ninth Circuit dealt with the issue of certification in McLinn upon its
remand from the en banc decision. 105 In McLinn II, the appellees requested
certification of the state law issue to the Alaska Supreme Court, 106 which
91. Id. at 105.
92. Id. at 106.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 742 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1984).
96. Id. at 506-07 (quoting Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974)); see also Aetna Ins.
Co. v. Craftwall ofIdaho, Inc., No. 84-3774, slip. op. at 9-10 (9th Cir. April 19, 1985) (directing district
court to consider certifying a question of state law to the Idaho Supreme Court upon remand).
97. The supreme courts of Washington and Alaska have certification procedures. See supra note
85. The supreme courts of Hawaii, Idaho, and Oregon will also certify questions of state law from
federal courts. See HAWAII REv. STAT. §§ 02-05(2) (1976), HAWAII R. APP. P. 13; IDAHo App. R. 12; OR.
REV. STAT.§ 28.200-.255 (1983).
98. In Re McLinn II, 744 F.2d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 1984).
99. 607 F.2d 274 (9th Cir. 1979).
100. Id. at 278-99.
101. 659 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1981).
102. Id. at 899.
103. 714 F.2d 1008, 1009 (9th Cir. 1983).
104. The Ninth Circuit has discussed the appropriateness of certification with respect to the
requirements of state certification procedures. See Aetna Ins. Co. v. Craftwall of Idaho, Inc., No.
84-3774, slip. op. at 9-10 (9th Cir. April 19, 1985); Meckert v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 742 F.2d 505,
506 (9th Cir. 1984). However, it has not developed its own criteria for determining when to submit an
issue of state law to a state supreme court for certification.
105. In Re McLinn II, 744 F.2d 677, 681-82 (9th Cir. 1984).
106. Id. at 681.
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adopted certification procedures in 1980.107 The Ninth Circuit held, how-
ever, that circumstances were not compelling enough to require certifica-
tion.108 The court noted the lack of guidance in prior Ninth Circuit deci-
sions and looked instead to the Fifth Circuit for applicable standards. 109 The
court determined that the question certified must be close and must be
important to the state in terms of comity. The issue should be one that can
realistically be resolved by the state court. The court should also consider
the possible expenses and delay involved in certification. 110
The criteria adopted by the Ninth Circuit inMcLinnlI are consistent with
the goals of certification and with the standards suggested by the Supreme
Court in Lehman Brothers v. Schein.1"I They also show appropriate con-
cern for both the Erie objective of having federal courts apply accurately
ascertained state law and for the state interest in consistent doctrine. 112 The
criteria of McLinn II do not indicate, however, when an issue should be
considered unclear for purposes of certification.
The McLinn litigation suggests a useful rule for determining when an
issue should be considered unclear and should .thus be certified. If district
and appellate courts differ in their resolution of a state law issue, that
difference demonstrates that the issue is unclear. This recognizes that at the
district court level the relative clarity of an issue may be difficult to
determine by objective criteria. At the appellate level, the concurrence or
disagreement with the district court indicates the clarity or ambiguity of an
issue. Disagreement certainly shows a lack of federal ability to resolve the
issue. 113
107. See ALASKA APP. R. 407.
108. McLinn 11, 744 F.2d at 681-82.
109. Id. at 681.
110. Id. The court also considered the requirements of ALASKA APP. R. 407, which governs
certification. Id. at 681-82. That rule allows certification only of issues which may be determinative of
the cause of action. Because there was an unresolved factual question in McLinn, it was unclear if the
issue would be determinative. This also weighed in the court's decision not to certify. See 17 WRIOHT &
MILR, supra note 1, § 4248, at 172 (Supp. 1985) (certification inappropriate where disputed factual
issues make it unclear whether state law issue is dispositive).
111. 416 U.S. 386, 390-91, 394 (1974); see also supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
112. SeeMcLinn I, 744 F.2d at 681-82.
113. This rule suggests that certification should be used less by the district court, but should be
made more available upon appeal. This would have the additional advantage of requiring district courts
to undertake the process of ascertaining state law. This accords with the Supreme Court's ruling in
Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 237 (1943) that federal courts have a duty to apply
state law. The Meredith holding can be better reconciled with the use of certification if certification
occurs at the appellate level. At that stage, the federal court has undertaken the duty to ascertain state
law. The application of the rule suggested above insures that that duty is relinquished only where there is
a definite indication that the issue is indeed ambiguous. In addition, certification at the appellate level
gives the plaintiff the benefit of choice of forum up to that point, and, therefore, certification is a
minimal incursion on federal jurisdiction. See L MooPE, supra note 23, .203[5], at 2162. Moore
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The federal judge would, however, still have discretion to decide whether
to certify. 114 The judge would be able to decide the issue in federal court if it
would be in the best interests of the parties; for example, when certification
would involve extensive delay and the issue is only incidental to the
litigation. 115 The judge should have similar flexibility in deciding whether
to certify when compelling state interests are involved. 116 If the decision
would affect state policies or other fundamental state concerns, then
federal courts should decline to decide the state law issue on this basis,
regardless of the concurrence of district and appellate judgment. The
standards for determining compelling state interest with respect to absten-
tion would be appropriately applied in these situations. 117
Although federal courts cannot avoid deciding state law altogether, 18
they can reduce the risk of developing a separate body of federally created
state law. Liberal use of certification will result in fewer issues of state law
being decided in federal court, and those that remain will be based on state
precedent. 19De novo review of these issues will not result in the creation of
new doctrine. It will simply provide review for the parties involved.
suggests that Meredith is still sound doctrine with respect to certification and that it provides a basis for
restricting the use of certification by the district courts.
114. The decision to certify rests in the discretion of the federal judge under Lehman Bros. v.
Schein. 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974).
115. The Fifth Circuit, which has used certification most extensively, suggests several factors
which should be considered in deciding whether to certify. These include considerations of comity with
respect to the state interest involved and the practical limitations of the certification process, namely the
possible delay involved and the ability of the state court to produce a helpful response. See Florida ex
rel. Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266,274-75 (5th Cir. 1976); see also Marston v. Red River Levee
& Drainage Dist., 632 F.2d 466, 468 n.3 (5th Cir. 1980).
116. Issues of interpretation of state statutes, for example, might warrant greater use of certifica-
tion due to the state interest in construing its own statute. The Ninth Circuit suggests in Madsen v.
Commissioner, 659 F.2d 897,899 (9th Cir. 1981), and Mutschler v. People's Nat'l Bank, 607 F.2d 274,
278-79 (9th Cir. 1979), that certification is particularly appropriate for questions of interpretation of
state statutes.
Where a compelling state interest is involved, Burford-type abstention might be appropriate. This
would remove the case from federal court entirely rather than having the federal court apply the state
court's answer to a question of state law. See 17 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 1, § 4248, at 520
(relation of certification to Burford-type abstention), §§ 4244-45 (Burford-type abstention generally).
117. See supra note 114.
118. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
119. Where clear state precedent exists, the district and appellate courts will be able to base their
judgment on that prececent. If it is indeed clear, they should concur. If they do, then under the rule
suggested above, see supra text acompanying notes 109-11, that federal decision will stand. On the
other hand, if there is little or no state precedent, the district and appellate courts will have little
guidance in deciding state law issues and their determinations are likely to differ. These are the issues
that would be certified to state courts under the suggested rule.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The McLinn decision abandons the Erie goal of conformity. By rejecting
the expertise of the district judge, it reduces the ability of federal courts to
accurately ascertain and apply state law. After McLinn, federal decisions of
state law are less likely to accurately reflect probable state action. They are
also more likely to be relied on as precedent by federal courts. This
encourages the development of a body of separate, federally created state
law.
McLinn does, however, represent an appropriate resolution of the con-
flict between pursuing the Erie goal of conformity and the goal of providing
full review. When state law issues must be decided in federal courts, the
McLinn de novo standard provides parties the full review to which they are
entitled. The benefit of full review offsets the cost in loss of local expertise.
Although de novo review increases the probability of federal develop-
ment of divergent state law, this consequence can be avoided by the
adoption of supplemental reforms. Of these possible reforms, increased use
of certification offers the greatest potential for insuring that federal courts
apply the same state law that is applied in state courts. Certification allows
unclear state law issues to be decided by the state courts themselves.
Certification of state law issues on which the federal district and appellate
courts disagree would resolve these issues in the appropriate forum and
reduce the danger of federal courts creating their own body of state law.
Wendy E. Russell
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